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ABSTRACT
Over the last few decades, two theoretical approaches
have been developed to explain the relationship between
governments and interest groups: corporatism and plural
ism. Traditionally, France has been labeled a corporatist
state, however some characteristics of this nation suggest
that it may in fact be a quasi-corporatist system, which
might provide an explanation for the lack of unity and
integration within the European Economic Community (EEC).
Using French agricultural interest groups as a case study,
this thesis will explain and demonstrate the impact pres
sure groups have upon the decision-making process.
Case
studies from 1965, 1968, and 1983 suggest that French
agricultural producers have the ability to influence policymaking in France, even when it does not coincide with the
opinions of governmental officials.
These case studies also
suggest that even though some features of corporatism exist
in France, characteristics of pluralism are also prevalent.
Therefore, France may not completely fit into this supposed
evolutionary age of corporatism.

FRANCE:

A QUASI-CORPORATIST STATE

INTRODUCTION
Interest groups have long existed in societies.

They

provide men a means of organizing themselves in order to
best express their opinions and interests, so that they may
achieve their goal of influencing public policy.

Over the

past few decades scholars have become quite interested in
this on going exchange between societies and their
political systems. As a result of their studies, they have
developed two theoretical approaches explaining this
relationship:

corporatism and pluralism.

According to the

corporatist model there exist formal channels of access and
communication between the state and pressure groups. There
fore both participate in the decision-making process and the
establishment of policies, which result from it.

The

pluralist approach does not believe that any institution
alized relationship exists between interest groups and the
government.

Therefore these groups must attempt to

influence governmental policy through the use of public
propaganda, demonstrations, strikes, and the use of personal
contacts.
Some scholars believe that since World War II many
nations have begun to evolve into corporatist nations,
thereby suggesting that the twentieth century may be the age
of corporatism.

France however, does not appear to be
2
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following this trend.

The relationship between French

agricultural workers and the government seems to be marked
by both corporatist and pluralist characteristics.

Some

formal channels of access between these groups and the state
have been established, as for example The Federation
Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA),
which was developed by the government after World War II in
order to facilitate its communications with farmers.
However, despite these types of government established
committees, agricultural interest groups still find the use
of demonstrations, such as those of 1965, 1968, and 1983, to
be quite effective in influencing policy.

Since

characteristics of both theories, corporatism and pluralism
exist, France can only be labeled a quasi-corporatist state.

CHAPTER I
INTEREST GROUPS AND CORPORATISM IN FRANCE
Over the last few decades, scholars have developed two
theoretical approaches to explain the relationship between
society and state:

pluralism and corporatism.

France has

traditionally been characterized as a corporatist nation.
However, some characteristics of this system, such as the
relationship between farm groups and the government, do not
coincide with the concepts of corporatism, thereby suggest
ing that France may be a quasi-corporatist state.

This

raises implications for Europe, possibly explaining the lack
of integration within the European Economic Community (EEC).
A.

Interest Groups:
Corporatism and pluralism have helped to establish the

different types of interest groups and their various forms
of access into the political system.

An interest group can

be defined as a collection of individuals who unite on the
basis of a common interest in order to influence public
policy, but without attempting to control the political
apparatus.

Because of the varying types of interests these

groups represent, according to Rod Hague and Martin Harrop,
they can be classified under six different types:

Communal,

Customary, Institutional, Protective, Promotional, and
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Associational.1

The organization of Communal groups is based

not upon a common interest, but rather upon a common bond
which exists among members.
group, not recruited.

New members are born into the

Very similar to Communal groups are

Customary groups which are also united by a common bond.
However, these types of groups do articulate interests
through kinship and personal ties.

Institutional groups are

characterized by their formal organization,
armies, legislatures and bureaucracies.

for example

Because of their

proximity to the government, their articulated interests
have considerable impact upon policy-making.

Protective

groups are organized to uphold the material interests of
their members, for example trade unions or employer*s
organizations.

These groups are quite influential in the

decision-making process since they often serve as consultants
to the government.

Promotional groups are joined by their

desire to promote certain activities or values rather than to
protect the interests of its members.

These groups are most

significant in first world countries where they can freely
express the values and morals they stand for.
groups are organized for a specific purpose.
and aims are limited.

Associational
Their interests

How then do these different types of

pressure groups gain access into the political system?

^ o d Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and
Politics (New Jersey:
Humanities Press International, Inc.,
1987), pp. 121-125.
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B.

Channels of access:
Interest groups influence the decision-making process

either through direct dealings with the government, through
political parties, or through public opinion.

The basis for

the group's organization often determines what method is best
for penetrating the political system.

Direct contact between

groups and government officials occurs under various forms.
First there can be group representation in the political
elite itself, making this one of the most effective forms of
access.

However, problems exist since members of the

political elite represent various interests and these may
sometimes conflict with one another.
another form of direct contact.

Elite connections are

In this group, leaders

establish and use their relationships with government
officials to influence their voice and vote in the
formulation of policy.

Elite connections are simply a

network of personal relations which provide informal channels
of access into the government.

The bureaucracy and

assemblies can also serve as means of obtaining access.
However, the level of penetration into these branches depends
upon the openness of the political system.
Interest groups can also attempt to influence decisions
through indirect methods, such as through political parties
and the media.

Pressure groups can offer their support and

votes to political parties in return for the representation
of their interests.

Mass media can be used to steer public

opinion in a particular direction.

When neither direct nor

indirect means of influencing the government are accessible,
interest groups turn to protest and violence as methods of
expressing their political demands.
The level of influence these pressure groups have is
largely determined by the nature of the political system
itself.

The more open the system (first world nations), the

greater effect they have.

The legitimacy of the group is

also a determining factor in its influencing power.

The

legitimacy accorded to the group, by both the government and
the public, establish the level of respectability given to
interest groups.

Another factor which determines a group's

influence is its level of tangible resources, which includes
its financial power and member^.d.p level.
C.

Corporatism vs. Pluralism:
The debate over corporatism and pluralism has attracted

scholars of many disciplines, backgrounds, and convictions.
Philippe C. Schmitter has emerged as the leading expert and
most widely recognized author in this field of study.
Schmitter defines corporatism and pluralism as the following
Corporatism can be defined as a system of inter
est representation in which the constituent units
are organized into a limited number of singular,
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered
and functionally differentiated categories,
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the
state and granted a deliberate representational
monopoly within their respective categories in
exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands
and support.
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units
are organized into an unspecified number of
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multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type
or scope of interest) categories which are not
specially licensed, recognized, subsidized,
created or otherwise controlled in leadership
selection or interest articulation by the state
and which do not exercise a monopoly of represen
tational activity within their respective cate
gories. 2
Corporatism and pluralism have both been developed as
means of understanding the relationship between the
interests of society and the authority of the state in
capitalist democracies.

After World War II, many academics

felt that conventional pluralist theories no longer provided
an adequate explanation of the changes that were taking place
between the state and various interest groups.

They believed

that pluralism assumed too passive a role for the state, and
that it failed to explain the process by which representative
lobbies were being transformed into mere extensions of their
governments.

Therefore, in an attempt to provide such an

explanation, these critics revived corporatist ideas, that
had been discussed as far back as World War I.
Scholars believed that the twentieth century would
become the age of corporatism, bringing an end to the
laissez-faire era.

After having disassociated corporatism

from is pejorative association with fascism and nazism,
academics then had to explain how this new form of interest
group/state relationship would come about.

In his book,

Le Corporatisme dissociation en Suisse. J. Malherbe
2Philippe C. Schmitter, Trends Toward Corporatist
Intermediation (London:
SAGE Publications, 1979), pp. 13 &
15.
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suggests that "corporatism appears under two very different
guises:

the revolutionary and the evolutionary.

It is

either the product of a 'new order1 following from a funda
mental overthrow of the political and economic institutions
of a given country and created by force or special
'collective spirit'; or the outcome of a natural evolution
in economic and social ideas and events."3

In the after-

math of the Second World War, nations, finding themselves in
the midst of widespread devastation and appalling poverty,
found a new willingness to bridge their national and
international differences in the task of reconstruction and
economic recovery.

There was a demand for restructuring the

division of labor and its benefits,

in order to create one

social class and the even distribution of wealth.

Europeans

wanted to expand their role in public policy by associating
and incorporating their classes and interest groups in the
political process, thereby involving themselves more closely
in the decision-making machinery.
What then, are the features of corporatism which
distinguish it from pluralism?

Similarities exist between

the two concepts in that both accept, recognize and seek to
offer solutions to coping with the growing structural
differentiation and interest diversity of modern political
systems.

The most prominent feature of corporatism is a set

of statutory institutions, whose function is to facilitate
contacts between government officials and representatives of
3Schmitter, p. 15.

authorized interest groups.

This process assures the

mandatory participation of interest groups in the decision
making process, which are given the opportunity to bargain
over policy with government representatives and a cartel of
organized pressure groups.

In order to further integrate

interest groups into the political system, corporatism also
charges them with implementing policy decisions.

Because of

this institutionalized access into the decision-making
process, the need for personal associations within the
government, parliamentary lobbying and appeals to the public,
all in order to influence policy, are diminished.

States

under corporatist direction also experience few organized
demonstrations and strikes since communication between groups
and the government is so thorough.
Corporatism has also been divided into two subtypes:
social and state corporatism.

Corporatist theorist, Mihail

Manoilesco defines social corporatism as a system in which
the legitimacy and functioning of a government are depen
dent upon the activity of singular, noncompetitive,
hierarchically ordered representative groups.4

In other

words, a social corporatist system is one with relatively
autonomous, multilayered units, open and competitive
electoral processes and party systems.

In state corpora

tism, groups are created and maintained as auxiliary and
dependent organs of the state.

Under this form of corpora

tism, the legitimacy and functioning of the political system
4Schmitter, p. 20.

11
relies upon interest groups.

In state corporatist systems

interest groups are subordinate to the central political
power, elections are either nonexistent or plebiscitary, and
political parties are either dominated or monopolized by a
single party.
While corporatism lies at one end of the spectrum,
pluralism lies at the other.

In a pluralist type system

formal contacts between interest groups and government
officials are less frequent if not nonexistent.

Interest

groups work from outside the political machinery in order to
influence policy, instead of being directly involved in the
decision-making process.

Since no institutional channels

exist for these groups to penetrate the government, they
must rely upon personal contacts, their electoral strength,
the mobilization of public support, and when all else fails,
strikes and demonstrations.
D.

Corporatism in France:
How then does the French political system fit into

either of these models?

There are divergent views on the

nature of French interest group politics.

While some

scholars, such as Henry W. Ehrmann, have categorized France
as a corporatist state, others, for example Philippe C.
Schmitter, believe it to be a pluralist system.

Beginning

with the Third Republic, interest groups in France have
played an important role in shaping political attitudes and
governmental policy.

Traditionally, leaders of these

pressure groups have been brought together with public

officials through the use of consultative committees.

After

World War II the number of these bodies was largely
increased.

However, in 1958 their numbers and power

declined due to the personal philosophy of President Charles
de Gaulle, who viewed them as particularistic and therefore
not useful to the public's interest.

In 1981, when the

Socialist Party came into office, once again the number of
committees increased as the Socialist government sought
greater democratic participation through its program of
decentralization.

Groups that had previously been excluded,

or that had been inactive, as well as a few new ones, were
given membership on committees.

Over the years however, the

government has shown a lack of control over the activities,
interests pursued, and the selection of leadership within
these groups.

There has also been the lack of, if not the

total absence of interest group/state negotiations.

As a

result, pressure groups have not always been allowed to
participate in the decision-making process.
In 1982, Frank L. Wilson,, of Purdue University, interviewed
several French interest group leaders and members? his
findings were later published in The American Political
Science Review.

Dr. Wilson reported that "nearly all

respondents claimed that the government dominated the
committees.

Very few committees had anything more than a

purely consultative or advisory task:

the government could,
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and often did, ignore the advice.”5

Some academics there

fore argue that in actuality the French system is not a
corporatist model, since its corporatist ideas have only a
paper existence.
French agricultural interest groups offer a good
example of the low level of corporatism and presence of
pluralism in France, causing some experts to label this
political system at most a quasi-corporatist state, since it
does not completely fit into either model.

After World War

II, until 1981, extensive corporatist interaction was most
visible in the agricultural sector.

However, as previously

discussed, though there are corporatist type structures, this
does not necessarily mean that corporatism exists,
especially when the government fails to give any power to
pressure groups.

As in the case of France neither conser

vative nor leftist governments have ever granted political
power to any of the groups they proliferated.

Historically

corporatism has infiltrated the French agricultural sector by
providing it with a national interest association, The
Federation Nationale des Syndicats d 'Exploitants Agricoles
(FNSEA), and at times with conferences and committees meeting
with government officials.

However interest groups' lack of

power in policy making and the breakdown of communications
between government ministers and group leaders, has often
caused these groups to seek other methods of influence.
5Frank L. Wilson, French Interest Group Politics:
Pluralist or Neocorporatist?” The American Political
Science Review (1982), p. 900.

As a
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result, characteristics of pluralism, such as public relations
campaigns, personal contacts, parliamentary lobbying, demon
strations and strikes also exist in the French political
system.
E.

Conclusion:
Many scholars believe that the current movement toward

corporatism has been facilitated by the presence of social
democratic governments? France however seems to be an
exception to this purported trend.

The organization and

activities of French agricultural interest groups, as well as
their relations with government officials and their power to
influence policy decisions have not always demonstrated signs
of an evolutionary movement toward corporatism.

At times,

interest group/state relations in France have reflected some
characteristics of pluralism.

This suggests that instead of

corporatism, France is actually evolving into a quasicorporatist state.

Why then has corporatism failed to

completely penetrate the French system?

In the case of the

agricultural sector, this failure is due to the power and
organization of agricultural workers.

CHAPTER II
POWER AND ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
"It is all too easy to fall into the trap of giving
undue emphasis to the proclaimed objectives of official
policy makers to the neglect of the obstacles in their
path."1

Most examinations of the agricultural policy of

France, focus upon the ideas, opinions, and decisions of
the French government. The interests and needs of those
closest and most directly involved in agriculture, the
farmers, are sometimes overlooked or misunderstood.

Yet

farmers wield such political power that they greatly
influence the decision-making process.
A.

Source of agricultural power:
In democratic societies such as France, government

officials acquire power through an election or appointment
process, and exercise this power within the limits and
regulations of the established political system.

There

fore, their power is rendered unto them by voters, for
without the support of citizens they can not legitimately
attain positions of power.

Power, however, can also be

obtained outside of the political apparatus and without

York:

^ a c k Hayward, The State and the Market Economy (New
New York University Press, 1986), p. 1.
15
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the support of a majority.

For example, for years, French

agricultural workers have had the ability, or power, to
influence the decision-making process of France.

If their

power to influence is not due to the results of public
elections, then how is it gained?
The political and social power of French farm workers
is derived from several different sources.

One explanation

for their strength is their perceived role and importance
in French history.

It was the French peasantry that

organized and led the Revolution of 1789, which caused
France to break away from its long period of a ruling
monarchy and restructure its political and social systems.
Therefore, farm workers have often been commended for
laying the social and political ground work of the Third
and Fourth Republics.

In turn, this prestige has helped to

legitimize their ideas and opinions.
Fisher explains,

As Sydney Nettleton

"some historians feel that the French

Revolution helped to give increased political strength to
the farmers, who developed their large numbers into
powerful pressure groups to resist displacement and obtain
protection."2
A second factor explaining why French agricultural
workers are so powerful is the numbers they represent.
Prior to its engagement in the European Common Market, over

2Sydney Nettleton Fisher, France and the European
Community (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 86.
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40% of France1s population was classified as agricultural.3
It is therefore understandable why fanners, representing
such a large percentage of the population, became so
important to the French government.

For example, in 1957,

French officials first sought the support of the agrarian
society before approaching the Parliament for ratification
of France's Common Market membership.

Quite logically, to

many politicians, 4 0% of the population could simply be
translated or transformed into 4 0% of the people's vote, by
representing the interests of French farmers.
However, since 1957, the percentage of Frenchmen
involved in agriculture has drastically declined.

Between

1954 and 1979, 3.2 million people left the agricultural
sector.4

By 1980, only 8.62% of the French population was

still involved in agriculture.5

There are two main reasons

why so many French farmers left their farms:

industrial

ization and the French government's "remembrement" program.
After World War II, France began a period of rapid in
dustrial growth.

As industries were established and

developed, employment opportunities quickly grew and many
farmers realized that more money was to be earned in
France's factories than on its farms.

Historically, French

3Fisher, p. 86.
4Henry W. Erhmann, Politics France (Boston:
Brown and Company, 1983), p. 29.

Little,

5Mervyn O. Pragnell, The International Year Book and
Statesmen's Who's Who 1987 (England: Thomas Skinner
Directories, 1987), p. 198.
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farmers have held small amounts of land, which most often
were divided into several dispersed parcels.

After joining

the EEC, the French government began pursuing "remembrement,M a plan which would unite and connect small in
dividual segments of land, creating fewer, but larger
farms.

As a result of this consolidation process, by 198 0

around half a million of France's 1.2 million farms were
more than 50 acres, with more than 150,000 of these being
above 125 acres.6

In 1955, there existed 2,300,000 farms

in France, whereas in 1980, there were only 1,2 60,000, a
decline of 2.5% per year.7

Today, though French farmers no

longer represent a majority of the population, they remain
powerful.

One reason is that their past numbers, which

once gave them a majority, has also provided them a certain
level of respectability, which has been carried through to
the 1 980's.

Secondly, despite declines in the number of

farm workers, agricultural production in France has
steadily increased, changing the social significance of
farmers to an economic importance.
A third explanation of why French farmers are so
influential is the economic values they represent to France
and the Common Market.

85% of the French soil is arable,

making France not only a predominantly agricultural nation,
but also the largest potential farming area in the
6Tony Allan, Ed., Library of Nations:
France
(Chicago, Illinois:
Time Life Books Pub., 1985), p. 92.
7Pragnell, p. 196.
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Community.8

Today, French agricultural production

represents 27% of the European Market's agricultural
output.9

This of course gives the French government a

substantial amount of power within the European Economic
Community (EEC), which imports 66% of France's agricultural
exports.10

Often labeled as the "bread basket of Europe,"

France provides her EC partners a large percentage of
their food supplies.

Among countries that, not too long

ago, experienced the pain, suffering and death caused by
shortages of food, France finds its high levels of agricul
tural production to be quite influential.

These high

levels of productivity, however, have not always existed.
For example, before 1939 France produced only ten to twelve
million tons of grain per year, but by 1970 she was
producing 36 million tons annually.11

This increase in

productivity is attributed to the rise in the use of modern
machinery and technology, such as tractors and fertilizers.
For example, in 1950 there were more than two million
farms, but only 150,000 tractors in use; however, by 197 3
there were 1.3 million farms and just as many tractors
being used.12

The European Community, through its CAP

8Pragnell, p. 195.
°Jean-Yves Potel, L'Etat de la France et de ses
habitants (Paris:
La Decouverte, 1985), p. 350.
10Pragnell, p. 200.
■^Allan, Ed., p. 91.
12Allan, Ed., p. 91.
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program and financial assistance, has been the primary
financial benefactor for France's agricultural moderniza
tion.

This often leaves French policy makers in a conflict

between serving the interests of the EC (its modernizer),
and French farmers (a great source of its yearly GNP).
B.

Organization of agricultural power;
"In every polity there exist means to bring the

demands and desires prevalent in the society to the
attention of the decision makers."13

Having the ability to

influence policy-makers is not sufficient.

In order to be

most effective, French agricultural workers also organize
themselves.
Throughout the history of France, the organization of
agricultural interests has undergone much internal con
flict.

During the Third Republic, many competing interest

groups fought to influence and obtain subsidies from the
government. But most failed under the Vichy Regime, which
was dominated by Germany.

After World War II, various sub

sidiary groups reasserted their autonomy.

These agricul

tural pressure groups differed according to their varying
interests, needs, and sometimes their geographical loca
tion.

Consequently, during the Fourth Republic there

existed over 500 different agricultural interest groups.
In 1946, the French government attempted to implement

13Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.,
Comparitive Politics:
Systems. Process, and Policy
(Boston:
Little, Brown, 1978), p. 169.
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the corporatist concept, when four large agricultural
organizations were established with governmental assis
tance, in hopes of uniting various pressure groups and
better combining their demands.

The Federation Nationale

des Syndicats d 1Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), the
Assemblee Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture (APCA), the
Confederation Nationale de la Mutualite, du Credit, et de
la Cooperation Agricole (CNMCCA) and the Centre Nationale
des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CNJA) all became the government's
instruments for modernizing France's means of agricultural
production.
In 1970, due to the FNSEA's quasi-governmental
reputation, all four organizations were turned over to
FNSEA officials and are now largely supported by public
funds.

However, many branches of the government still

recognize the FNSEA as the only representative of farmers'
interests.

These four organizations, under the leadership

of the FNSEA, have often been criticized for not represent
ing the interests of French farmers, but rather simply
reflecting those of the government.

Rival organizations

complain about governmental pressures, especially in
regions where they threaten the FNSEA's dominance.
Opposition by farmers to the policies of the French
government and those of the Common Market, led to severe
tensions within the FNSEA and the eventual emergence of
rival groups.

The failure of the FNSEA to organize and

consolidate agricultural interests, represents the French
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g o v e r nments inability to assimilate corporatism into its
political system.
The strongest of these opposition groups is the
Mouvement de Defense des Exploitant Familiaux (MODEF),
founded in 1959.

MODEF represents the interests and

demands of small agricultural producers.

It's program is

inspired by the Communist party and is anti-capitalist.
However, it defends property owners and stands against the
French government's "remembrement" policy, which it feels
only works to the advantage of large agricultural
producers, since only they can afford to buy land, while
small farmers can only afford to sell theirs.

Other

opposition groups were also founded, such as, the Federa
tion Francaise de 1* Agriculture (FFA) in 19 69, the
Confederation Nationale des Syndicats de TravailleursPaysans (CNSTP) founded in 1981, and most recently the
Federation Nationale des Syndicats Paysans (FNSP) in 1982.
The existence of the various opposition groups, demon
strates the presence of pluralism in the French system.
Nonetheless, they are still not as effective as the FNSEA,
which continues to operate with government support.

This

on-going relationship between the FNSEA and the government
represents a continued existence of corporatism, however
because it co-exists with pluralism, the French system fits
completely into neither model, and is therefore a quasicorporatist state.
Since 1981, the Mitterrand government has been
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pursuing a program of decentralization, which has opened up
new access to other pressure groups,
in France.

furthering pluralism

What has been France's policy toward agricul

ture since World War II?

This increase in pluralism also

raises some implications for Europe, possibly explaining
the lack of unity with the EEC.

The exploration of

corporatism at the European Community level has somewhat
been neglected by scholars, despite the fact that the EC
has encouraged its development in member nations.

The

impact of quasi-corporatism in France upon the Community
will be further discussed in Chapter III.

CHAPTER III
FRENCH AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND EC AGRICULTURAL POLICY
A.

French policy:
After the tremendous destruction caused by World War

II, France underwent some fundamental changes in her
institutions, ideologies and means of production.

This

transformation was based upon three concepts: nationaliza
tion, planning and modernization.

In 1957, the French

government helped formulate and establish the European
Economic Community. France hoped that, through its parti
cipation in the EEC, its agricultural production would
attain a level of self-sufficiency, which it regarded as a
vital part of France's national defense.

French officials

believed that the adoption of a free trade system within
Europe would help hasten structural adjustments and the
modernization of France's productive apparatus.

Free trade

would bring in competition for both the industrial and the
agricultural producers, thereby forcing them to adopt new
policies and means of production in order to remain
competitive with foreign producers.
Establishing self-sufficiency was not enough to ensure
France's national security, especially at a time when past
experiences with Germany continued to haunt Frenchmen.
24
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Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, said that
through economic unification he wanted to make sure that
war between France and Germany "is not only unthinkable,
but materially impossible."1

The French government

believed that by including West Germany in this European
organization, the threat of another German attack would not
only be curtailed, but in any case could at least be
containable.

Another reason for joining the EC was that as

France began losing control of her colonial empire, the
European market became her most viable substitute.

The

Community was more dynamic than France*s colonial markets,
which after independence were faced with internal
structural problems.

The Common Market eventually turned

out to be a substitute for France's lost colonial markets.
B.

EC oolicv:
The two major achievements of the Community are the

establishment of a customs union and the development of a
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Provisions for the

Common Market called for the elimination of all custom
duties between member states over a ten year transitional
period.

Traditionally, prior to the establishment of the

EEC, the French market was safeguarded from foreign
competitors by numerous protectionist measures making it
somewhat more difficult for French producers to adapt to
1Sydney Nettleton Fisher, France and the European
Community (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 84.
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this custom free market.

The French population, as a

whole, was not too enthusiastic about this new policy
orientation.

But many French officials believed that a

customs free market would promote the industrialization and
technological advancement of France, which at this time
lagged behind other European states.
C.

The Common Agricultural Policy:
It was not until January of 1962, four years after the

establishment of the EEC, that the general terms for a
Common Agricultural Policy were drawn up.

Though the EC

was founded upon liberal trading principles, the CAP was
structured around the belief that protectionism was
essential in the agricultural sector.

Article 39 of the

Treaties of Rome which established the EEC, set out the
five objectives of the CAP:
1.

To increase agricultural productivity?

2.

To ensure a fair standard of living for the
agricultural community;

3.

To stabilize markets;

4.

To assure the availability of supplies?

5.

To ensure that supplies reach consumers at
reasonable prices.2

The CAP was established upon three basic principles:

free

internal trade, preference for member countries and shared
financial responsibilities.

This program consists of two

2Andrea Boltho, Ed., The European Economy;
Growth and
Crisis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 234.
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basic parts:

a market policy, which guarantees prices, and

a structural policy, which provides funding for improving
agricultural efficiency.

The market policy, or the

European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),
prescribes prices for products, provides import levies,
export subsidies and subsidies for domestic markets.

The

financing for these support systems is shared by all
members of the Common Market through the organization's
budget.
D.

The CAP and French policy:
When the CAP was established, its objectives were

quite congruent with those of the French government: both
sought to increase the market capacity for producers and to
improve their means of production.

At this time, it could

be said that French policy, especially in the agricultural
sector, was a mere reflection of the EEC's program. Accord
ing to author Udo Rehfeldt,

"to some extent, the CAP (which

has consisted mainly of price subsidies) has completed the
French agricultural policy of 'structural reforms'
inaugurated in I960."3

By providing subsidies to French

farmers, the Community has helped the French government
achieve its goals at a lower price than it would have
incurred had it had to solely support its agrarian society.

3Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, Integration and
Unequal Development:
The Experience of the EEC (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 171.
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CAP subsidies partially freed the French budget from the
need to provide agricultural subsidies, thus enabling the
French government to provide greater assistance to its
industrial sector, which was being challenged by highly
structured and technocratic West German manufacturers.
In 1957, well over 40% of the French population was
involved in agriculture, giving farmers great political
power.

In light of their political strength, it is

understandable why the French government sought the support
of its agrarian society.

French officials stressed to

their farmers that membership in the Common Market and
economic integration would provide great benefits to French
agriculture.

The French government also explained to

farmers that participation in the EC would not only help
unify Europe economically, but that political integration
would also eventually occur.

With the memories of good

scarcities during the two World Wars still vivid in their
minds, and their ambitions for a prosperous agricultural
recovery, French fanners supported the conditions
establishing the Common Market as well as the 1962
provisions which founded the CAP.
E.

Problems with the CAP:
By 1970 the Common Agricultural Policy seemed to have

failed.

The cost of the policy to the Community*s budget

had rapidly risen since the mid-1960*s.

The cost of food

to the consumer was forced up by farm prices, which were
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far above the level at which competitive supplies were
available from the world market.

Yet despite these high

prices, many EC farmers lived in poverty.

Surplus produc

tion of several different products not only further
burdened the community's budget, but also disrupted world
agricultural markets.

Increases in the E E C •s membership

changed the balance of interests represented in the CAP.4
Employment in agriculture dropped from "22.7% of the
civilian labor force of the six in 1958 to 11.5% in 1972."5
Another problem faced by the CAP was the exchange rate
variations of member country currencies.
In answer to these many problems facing the CAP, the
Commission of the European Communities proposed a
structural reform program which ensured that some five
million Europeans would leave agriculture by 1980, taking
some five million acres of land out of farming.

EC

officials believed this program would not only bring about
a reduction of agricultural surpluses, but would also
eventually raise the incomes of farmers.

The Council of

Ministers agreed on the main features of a revised
structural policy in 1971.

By April 1972, three directives

were approved on farm modernization, the provision of
retirement aids, and vocational guidance.
4Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the
European Economic Community on January 1, 1973.
5John S. Marsh, European Economic Issues (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 10.
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F.

Conclusions:
Agricultural policies are usually made by governments

for their own people.

Therefore international decisions,

such as those of the EC, about domestic farm policy are
often regarded as of secondary importance.

The European

Community, in establishing the CAP, has had to contend with
complex internal problems.

The Common Agricultural Program

was founded and operates upon a bargaining process where
decisions are often the result of compromise.

The CAP has

made great contributions to the development of the
Community, but since the 1970's, EC agricultural policy has
tended to exemplify disunity, rather than convergence
between Community members. This lack of unity can be
attributed to changes which have taken place outside of the
CAP, such as inflation and the expansion of EC membership.
However,

it is also due to the lack of corporatism within

the political systems of member states.

For example, as

pluralism began infiltrating the corporatist system of
France,

it created various interest groups, each seeking to

influence government policy in favor of its own interests.
Even though pluralism has helped to develop a more
democratic and open system in France,
disunity within the nation.

it has also caused

EC member nations are

therefore faced with the task of creating unity from
within, before they can attempt to unite as a Community.
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Today the interests of the European Community do not
always coincide with those of its individual member
nations.

Therefore the French government, as well as

others, must choose between the needs of Europe and those
of its own people, as shown in the case studies in the
following chapter.

It is when nations choose to pursue

their self-interests, or the demands of their pressure
groups, that the welfare of the Common Market is threatened
and the visions of a "United States of Europe" begin to
fade.

CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDIES
Through the use of several case studies this chapter
will

demonstrate

tural

producers

the
and

influence
the

impact

power
they

of

French

have

had

agricul
upon

the

decision-making process of France and European integration.
A.

1965 case study:
Originally, French agricultural workers were committed

to the idea of a Common Market, even prior to the ratifi
cation of the Treaty.

It was not until 1965, eight years

after the establishment of the EEC, that French farmers
first opposed the Community's agricultural policy.

Why

then did these farmers change their views on the European
Common Market?

Changes in their attitudes and support can

best be explained by the ignorance which existed among
them.

In the beginning, farmers, along with many other

social classes, encouraged the unification of Europe, both
economically and politically.

A study made in early 1962

proved this to still be true, when "22 out of 100 peasants
(farmers) were 'very much for' efforts aiming at the
unification of Europe, and another 45 per cent were more
'for' than 'against' such efforts, with only 1 per cent
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'very much opposed', 29 per cent had no opinion."1
However,

"when it came to making sacrifices in the process

of unifying Europe, the peasantry (the farmers) was most
outspokenly against any such ideas."2

During the first

stages of discussions concerning the Treaties of Rome,
there was no direct communication between the French
government and the people.

In 1957, it appears that most

French farmers were not fully aware that changes were in
the making which would affect their own future more than
most policy measures of the past.

Government officials

only emphasized to agricultural organizations the positive
effects the EC would have upon farmers.

Therefore, the

initial support offered by French farmers was based upon
misinformation and misconceptions.

These agricultural

producers could only become informed by directly involving
themselves with, or rather being affected by, France's
participation in the Common Market.

Four years passed

between the ratification of the Treaty in 1957 and the
establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in
1962, and then a few more years passed before the impact of
the CAP could be felt? all of this explains the delay in
the farmers' reactions, which first occurred in 1965.
Throughout the Third and Fourth Republics, most of
the agricultural population supported all major political
1Hanns Peter Muth, French Agriculture and the Political
Integration of Western Europe (The Netherlands: A.W.
Sijthoff - Leyden, 1970), p. 178.
2Muth, pp. 178-179.
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movements, favoring both conservative and left-wing
parties.

At the beginning of the Fifth Republic farmers

began for the first time, consolidating their support of
the right-wing, thereby nationalizing their political
commitment.

Until 1958, relations between farmers and

President Charles de Gaulle had been quite smooth.

In

1958, an overwhelming majority of French citizens supported
de Gaulle, giving him 78.5% of their votes in the December
Presidential election.

However, after 1958, relations

between agricultural workers and President de Gaulle's
government became strained and bitter as farmers became
enraged by official policies.

Right from the beginning,

French agricultural workers had always supported France's
participation in the Common Market, believing they stood to
benefit from it.

French farmers were first angered by the

government in July of 1958, when it imposed various new tax
programs and decrees Which would increase prices by 7%, all
in order to hold the 1958 budget deficit to a maximum of
600 billion francs (or $1.43 billion); this plan, however,
at the same time reduced the previously promised 10%
increase in wheat prices to 7%.

As a result several

demonstrations were held, but all had little impact or
influence.
Farmers were best able to affect the government and
its policies in 1965.

Conflict of interests eventually

reached their peak between June and December of that year.
Original plans for financing a common EC agricultural
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policy, adopted in 1962, called for member states to
collect import levies separately, and then pay national
assessments into a fund established by the Community to
finance its farm program.

This farm program had

established the European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which financed two major farm
programs:
(1)

EEC purchases of surplus farm products?

(2)

Export subsidies for the sale of EEC farm
products to non-EEC countries, at world prices,
which were below Community prices.

This original program was due to expire June 30, 1965.
Therefore the Commission of the European Communities
submitted a new program proposal to its member nations.
Under the Commission's new agricultural policy,

import

levies would be paid directly to the EEC's agricultural
fund, which in turn would be controlled by the European
Parliament.
On June 15, 1965, French Foreign Minister, Maurice
Couve de Murville pushed for a two and a half year delay in
French plans for a Common Market in farm products, thereby
delaying the Common Agricultural Policy.

The French

government felt that the Commission's new program was just
another step toward "supranationalism" within the Commu
nity, and therefore, aiming to maintain some sovereignty,
it chose to oppose it.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

proposed to the European Council that complete EC control
of agriculture in the six member states be delayed from

36
July 1, 1967 to the end of 1969.

At this time it was

estimated that the French government's proposal would cost
France's farm economy one million dollars between 1967 and
1969, the proposed two and a half year delay period.

This

of course made no sense to either French farm federations
or the remaining five EC members, especially since France
stood to gain the most from a Common Agriculture Program.
French farmers began demonstrating and protesting in large
numbers.

Opposition to the French government's proposal

was also expressed within the EC, especially by Italian
Foreign Minister Fanfani.
After the Council failed to adopt an agricultural
finance plan at its June 30th meeting, French officials
announced on July 6th that France would boycott any future
EEC meetings.

On July 22, 1965, the Commission submitted a

revised proposal to its six members, which was primarily
designed to satisfy France.

This new proposal included two

major concessions to France:
(1)

The Commission dropped its earlier plans under
which the EEC would have had an independent
revenue from industrial duties and agricultural
levies, beginning July 1, 1967.

(2)

The Commission accepted the French proposal made
June 15th and 3 0th for the adoption of an
agricultural finance plan to run from July 1,
1965 through December 31, 19 69.

Much to the dismay of French farmers, the French government
accepted this new program.

Though French agricultural

producers were unable to sway the demands of their govern
ment, later on that year they were able to create some
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impact on its future European policies.
Producers, who continued to support the idea of
economic integration, felt that Charles de Gaulle's govern
ment had not only damaged the unification process, but had
also hurt them economically.

Opposition to the government

increased, which became detrimental to Charles de Gaulle,
as he soon faced his second Presidential election in
December of 1965.

On December 3, 1965, only two days

before the first ballot election, Charles de Gaulle, in a
television address, pledged to work for the "economic
union" of the EC.

His statement had of course been

directed to French farmers, who by this time no longer
supported him.

De Gaulle's attempt at regaining their

votes was unsuccessful, and he therefore failed to obtain a
majority vote on the first ballot round, receiving only
43.97% of the votes.

However, on the second ballot, held

on December 19th, de Gaulle was able to defeat his major
opponent, Francois Mitterrand, with 55.2% of the vote.
Though Charles de Gaulle won the 1965 Presidential
election, he suffered a personal loss.

Prior to the first

ballot, de Gaulle believed an overwhelming majority of
Frenchmen supported him; therefore his lack of support was
not only a shock, but also a disappointment.
In 1965, "when de Gaulle and the agricultural syndi
cate, the FNSEA, were at loggerheads over the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), farmers voted against de Gaulle
in the Presidential election and were held (statistically)
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responsible for de Gaulle suffering the indignity of a
second ballot."3

The effects of the 1965 Presidential

election could somewhat explain why de Gaulle's government
pushed so hard in 1966 for high common price levels within
the EEC.

Once agreement was reached on common prices,

it

was estimated that France would gain the most from these
increases.

This government action might have been an

attempt to compensate farmers for the loss they were
thought to have incurred in 1965.

It could also have been

a means to regain their support before the 1968
Pariiamentary elections.4
The events of 1965 demonstrate the first case during
the Fifth Republic in which French farmers successfully
utilized their power, through the use of demonstrations and
their vote, in order to influence government policies.
Though their actions had little impact upon the EC's
adoption of a new agricultural financial plan for 1967,
they did influence future agricultural decision making.
this time,

At

farmers favored the integration of Europe,

believing that it would benefit their economic status.
Usually "farmers vote for the party or alliance which
promises them most in material gains and which carries out
3Philip G. Cerny and Martin A. Schain, Socialism, the
State and Public Policy in France (New York: Methuen, Inc.,
1985), p. 250.
4In June of 1968 the Gaullist part overwhelmingly won
in Parliamentary elections.
For more details on
Parliamentary elections in France see Politics in France by
Henry W. Ehrmann, Chapter IV, pages 100-135.
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.its promises through policy."5

Therefore, in 1965 it was

only natural that they favored EC policy over French
policy.
B:

1968-69 case studv:
Throughout 1968 and 1969 the French government once

again found itself in conflict with its farmers.

During

the course of 1968 doubts concerning the adequacy of the
existing Common Agricultural Policy began to emerge.

On

October 17, 1967, Dr. Sicco Mansholt, the member of the
European Commission in charge of agriculture, addressed the
Ministers of Agriculture of the Six.

Dr. Mansholt

explained to these ministers that even though the CAP had
barely been established, it was already reaching the limits
of its potential.

Prices could not be raised to a level

which would allow farm incomes to achieve parity with other
sectors without creating large surpluses for many products.
Income parity required a rapid growth of productivity in
European agriculture and simultaneously a continuation in
the reduction of the number of agricultural producers.
Before EC members Dr..Mansholt concluded that only a
fundamental change in the agricultural policy of the Com
munity could solve their problems, and therefore recom
mended that there should be Community regional planning of
agricultural production.

In light of Dr. Mansholt's

theories and ideas, the Ministers of Agriculture requested

5Cerny and Schain, p. 251.
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that he submit a full report to the Commission.
Dr. Mansholt*s call for a Community structural policy
heightened interest in the report he was preparing, but
also brought about various other thoughts for a new
approach.

On October 18, 1968, Dr. Mansholt presented his

findings and recommendations to the EEC Commission.

By the

end of December of 1968 the Commission had formally adopted
the proposals and submitted them to the Council of
Ministers.

The specific goals of the plan were:

(1)

to reduce the outlay for price support
operations;

(2)

to create larger, economically viable farms
which warrant capital investment and yield an
adequate return to their operators;

(3)

to use price policy to guide production in
accordance with requirements;

(4)

to take five million hectares of agricultural
land out of production;

(5)

to facilitate the movement of five million
persons out of agriculture during the 1970*s
either by advanced retirement schemes or by
training for other occupations; and

(6)

to improve marketing.6

Basically the plan suggested that the only practical way of
increasing the incomes of farmers was through a structural
reform of the production process.

Dr. Mansholt recommended

an increase in the size of farms and a reduction in the
number of farmers..

It was believed that industries, which

at the time enjoyed an annual growth rate in the GNP of 3%,
6John S. Marsh, European Economic Issues (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 142.
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could absorb this reduction of half the agricultural labor
force.

Larger and more productive farm units, however,

would worsen the problem of surpluses.

Therefore, the

Commission recommended that between 1970 and 1980 some five
million hectares of land be taken out of agriculture to be
reforested, thus diminishing the EC's deficit in wood.
There were various reactions to the Mansholt Plan,
but they

were hardly enthusiastic.

The Plan mostly served

to persuade member governments of the need for a new
approach in the CAP.

The Community's farmers were among

those most opposed and hostile to the Plan, which was quite
understandable since it was designed to remove half of them
from the land.

French government officials reacted by

stressing to other members that structural reform was the
responsibility of all involved in the EC.

Believing it had

to work towards reformation, the French government
appointed a commission, headed by Professor

Georges Vedel,

to study the future of French agriculture and make some
recommendations to alleviate any possible problems.

The

commission's findings, known as the Vedel Report, was
published in August of 1969.

The first part simply pre

sented an analysis of the problems facing French farmers.
At the request of the French Minister of Agriculture,
Jacques Duhamel, the Commission presented its proposed
remedies in June of 1969, under the title:
New Agricultural Policy.

Proposals for a

It was not until September of

1969, after three months had elapsed, that the document was
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published, demonstrating the French government's reluctance
to release a document which it knew its farmers would find
as provocative as the Mansholt Plan.
The Vedel Report called for the following, over a
fifteen year period:
(1)

a reduction in the number of farms in France
from 1.5 million to 250,000, each of which would
employ some two to four people;

(2)

a reduction in the active agricultural
population from 3 million to 600,000 - 700,000?

(3)

a cut of 12 million hectares in the present total
of 32 million hectares used for agriculture;

(4)

an increase in the minimum farm size from 2 0 to
80 hectares?

(5)

a doubling of average yields?

(6)

an increase in labour productivity by a factor of
5.5 times, and of farm output by 8 times, the
present level.7

Three measures were proposed by which these conditions
could be achieved:

the reform of market-support procedure

by placing land in reserve, social grants and grants for
modernization.8

Obviously the recommendations of the Vedel

Report were closely aligned to those of the Mansholt Plan.
The Vedel Report differed only in that it favored price
reductions and a greater emphasis on the withdrawal of land
from the agricultural sector.
In response to the Vedel Report, French farmers
staged nationwide protests from November 13th through the
7Marsh, pp. 154-155.
8Marsh, p. 155.
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2 8th in support of higher prices for their crops and to
oppose government plans to reduce the number of small
farms.

In an attempt to appease these farmers, French

Minister of Agriculture Duhamel publicly stressed that the
fact that the government had published the report did not
mean that it had accepted its conclusions and proposals.
By November 1969, in response to the ever-growing
opposition by farmers, both the Mansholt Plan and the Vedel
Report were revised.

The eventual goals for each of these

proposals were reduced in order to appease agricultural
producers, yet the plans still attempted to make some
structural changes.

Though farmers were still not

completely satisfied, they accepted these new proposals
since their impact would not be as drastic as those of
previous proposals.
In 1969, farmers once again proved that their
consolidated voice and actions can influence the decision
making process of Europe and their own governments. By
demonstrating their discontentment, European agricultural
workers succeeded in reducing the level of structural
reform pursued by the EC.

More important in regard to

this thesis is the influence French farmers had upon their
government.

Had it not been for their opposition to the

Vedel Report, French government officials may have
implemented policies which today could have had an impact
upon the numbers in agriculture and their income level.
Had French officials pursued the recommendations of the
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-Vedel Report, today's French agriculture population might
have been even lower than 8% with an income level even
lower than it is currently.

In 1969, the French farmer's

fight against the Vedel Proposal could also be regarded as
a battle for self-preservation.

Once again they proved

they had the power to influence policy-making not only in
France, but also within the European Community.
C.

1983 case study;
Another case, similar to the one of 1969, occurred in

the Spring of 1983.

In late April of 1983 the Mitterrand

government came under severe attacks in a series of demon
strations organized and led by several different groups for
various reasons.

Students, businessmen, and farmers all

held separate protests, some of which ended in clashes with
the police.

In 1982, agricultural revenue increased by

9.1%, but this increase was not equally distributed among
farmers.9

Wine and oleaginous producers gained the most,

while fruit and vegetable farmers received the least.

In

response to this, by April of 1983, French agricultural
producers began protesting that the EC's CAP policies and
France's importation of food were the causes for declines
in their incomes.

On April 25th, farmers in Normandy

attacked governmental offices in Caen, and unsuccessfully
attempted to burn down these buildings; similar attacks on
that same day were also launched in Auxerre and Burgundy.
9,'Le revenu agricole moyen a progresse de 9,1% en
1982," Le Monde (5 May 1983), p. 1.
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On April 26th fanners blockaded transit points on the
French-Belgian border in order to prevent imported food
products from entering the French market.

Loads of

imported pork were dumped unto the roads and a convoy of
1,000 pig farmers, holding captive a West German meat
truck, headed to Paris in order to protest EC policy.
French Minister of Agriculture, Michel Rocard, feared
further protest and violence on the part of farmers, after
EC officials failed to reach a resolution on European
agricultural prices on April 28th.

Indeed, after the

28th, French farmers increased their pressure upon the
government by carrying out further manifestations.

The

farmers1 push upon the government caused France1s Prime
Minister, Pierre Mauroy, to side with agricultural
producers and pursue policies which reflected their
interests.

On April 28, 1983 Prime Minister Mauroy, while

addressing the French National Assembly, made the following
statement:
Here, all of us must be keen to depend agriculture
to obtain the dismantlement of these farming sub
sidies. Unfortunately, today, it is not easy to undo
what was once, not long ago, requested by France.
However, all of us must fight to obtain satisfaction
and we should be unanimous in defending the interests
of France and its agriculture instead of creating
problems as some are doing.10
(Translation by
Josette L. Hawkes)

10,,Les agriculteurs francais veulent bloquer les
frontieres," Le Monde (29 April 1983), p. 10.
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A partial reduction of the amount of French monetary
compensations was officially confirmed by the government on
May 3, 1983.

This reduction would, in time, cause an

increase in French agricultural prices, which definitely
served the interests of France's farmers.

Once again

French agricultural workers were successful in influencing
French officials into pursuing policies which were to their
benefit.

The events of 1983 caused the French government

to choose the interests of its farmers over those of the
European Community.

The French government's commitment to

its farmers continued throughout 1983, causing disagree
ments and disunity within the European Common Market.
Members of the EC met June 17th through June 19th of
1983 in Stuttgart, West Germany, in order to settle their
budgetary disputes, which they had failed to resolve
earlier that year.

By 1983 the majority of the EC's budget

was being used to provide compensation payments to European
farmers.

Disagreement among Community members occurred

when Great Britain began arguing that it was pouring far
more money into the EC budget than it was receiving.
British officials explained that only countries with large
agricultural sectors, such as France, were benefiting from
the CAP, since they were receiving a fair return and,
sometimes even more, on their investment into the Common
Market budget.

As a result, Great Britain requested that

the EC refund it $1.7 billion from its 1983 contributions
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to the Community.

EC officials agreed to repay $670

million to Great Britain, but no comprehensive agreement
was reached covering the future of the CAP budget.
Officials did agree that Finance and Foreign Ministers of
the member nations would meet in Athens, Greece, in
December to resume negotiations.
By December, budgetary disputes also encompassed
arguments between those who wanted to rectify EEC finances
by cutting spending programs (this option being most
favored by Great Britain;) and those who wished to continue
these programs and raise more revenue, probably by increas
ing VAT (value added tax) contributions made by member
countries (a solution promoted by France).

The Athens

summit, held December 4th through the 6th failed to yield
any accord on a plan for reforming the finances of the EC.
The budgetary disputes also prevented Spain and Portugal's
request for entry into the Community from reaching the
floor for consideration.
In 1983, the French government's renewed commitment
to its agricultural producers is a major factor explaining
France's continued opposition to EC budget reform proposals
which did not reflect the interests of French farmers. This
1983 case demonstrates the ability of French agricultural
producers to sway government opinion and policy in their
favor.

It also reinforces the concept that the pursuit of

self-interest on the part of EC members undermines the goal
of unifying Western Europe.

Though in 1983 the French

government's policies favored its agricultural sector,

it

undermined the unity and further integration of Europe,
since it caused a further delay of the EC's approval of
Spain and Portugal's entry into the Common Market.

There

fore, often when French policy-makers choose to side with
France's farmers,

it is at the cost of the Community and

European integration.

It is quite possible that had the

events of 1983 not occurred, Spain and Portugal might have
entered the European Common Market at an earlier date than
they did in 1986.
D.

Conclusion
Unlike in Corporatist systems, the French government

has shown an inability to consolidate and maintain control
over its nation's interest groups.

In the case studies

presented, French agricultural producers have demonstrated
that they can effectively use their power to influence
policy decisions in France.

Through the use of their

voting power, as in 1965, and demonstrations, as in 1968
and 1983, farmers have been able to persuade the decisonmaking process in their favor.
supported groups,

Even state established and

such as the FNSEA, have demonstrated

opposition to the government as seen in 1965.

The

activities of these farmers' groups represent the existence
of pluralism in the French system.
at times,

Corporatism does exist

for example government officials sometimes meet

with leaders of these pressure groups in order to facili
tate discussions and improve state/interest group
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relations.

Therefore, since some forms of corporatism can

be found along side pluralism, the French system can not be
categorized into either model and should therefore be
labeled a quasi-corporatist state.
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CONCLUSION
States are founded and operate under various types of
governmental systems.

Societies, made up of different

people with diverse interests and ideas, often organize
themselves into many groups, known as interest groups, in
order to most effectively express their demands to their
government.

It is this relationship between governments

and interest groups that the theories of corporatism and
pluralism seek to explain.

Pluralists believe that there

is an unspecified number of interest groups within a
political system.

These pressure groups operate volun

tarily, are self-determined, competitive and nonhierarchically ordered.
by the state.

Groups are neither created nor controlled
In a pluralist system there is no monopoly

of representation within respective interest categories.
The best example of the pluralist model is the United
States, where members of society are free to organize
themselves and are self-guided and controlled.
Corporatism represents a completely different set of
ideas.

Corporatists believe that the interests of society

are organized by the state into a limited number of groups,
which are noncompetitive and hierarchically ordered.

A

monopoly of representation exists within respective cate
gories.

The government also controls the inner operations
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of these groups and the manner in which they choose to
express their demands.
Many scholars have often categorized France as a
corporatist nation.

In some ways the French system is

characterized by some traits of corporatism, for example in
its agricultural sector, The Federation Nationale des
Syndicats d'Exploitant Agricoles (FNSEA) was organized and
developed by the state in 1946 in order to represent the
interests of farmers.

Though today it is no longer under

government control it still operates under its favor.
Another example of corporatism in France is the existence
of open communication between government officials and
leaders of pressure groups.

However, the characteristics

of corporatism are often outweighed by pluralistic ones.
For example, the interests of the agricultural sectors are
not represented by just one group, various groups have been
established sometimes working in conjunction, at other
times opposing one another.

Nor are these interest groups

under government control, as seen in the three case studies
presented in Chapter IV.

They often use the power and

effects of strikes, demonstrations, public propaganda, and
personal contacts to influence the decision-making process
in their favor.

All of these traits of the French system

represent characteristics of pluralism.

Therefore, since

corporatism in France co-exists with pluralism,

it would be

wrong for scholars to label this a corporatist system.
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Instead France should be labelled as a quasi-corporatist
state.
Defining France as a quasi-corporatist nation raises
some implications for Europe and possible explanations for
the lack of unity within the EEC.

After World War II

France, along with other European nations founded the
European Communities,

in hopes of eventually integrating

both their economic and political systems.
to form a "United States of Europe" by 1992.

The dream was
So far

however, their desire for unity has been undermined by the
lack of cooperation and support within the organization.
Quasi-corporatism offers a possible explanation for this
lack of congruency.

For example in the French agricultural

sector, the state has often found itself having to choose
between the interests and demands of its farmers and those
of the EC.

The case studies presented in Chapter IV

demonstrate how influential French agricultural producers
can be in the formulation of policies that concern them.
With the Community at one end of the scale and domestic
interest groups at the other end, the state has become the
pivotal force that often determines which way the scale
will lean.

It is when interest groups succeed in persuad

ing their government to tip the scale in their favor that
the unity and integration of the European Community is
undermined.

If EEC members are truly committed to

economically and politically integrating themselves by
1992, they need to fully support the Community and possibly
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promote corporatism within their nations in order to better
control the interests of their societies.
The French model suggests that the corporatist/
pluratist concept is incomplete.

These two approaches

stand at opposite ends of the spectrum.

However, as seen

in this study of France and its agricultural interest
groups, there is a need for a theory which lies in between
these two approaches...possibly quasi-corporatism.
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